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The current account surplus of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has drawn much 
foreign and domestic attention. This paper focuses on the reasons and remedies for the 
PRC’s current account surpluses. Rather than deploying the standard explanations, we 
argue that asymmetric market liberalization and the related factor market distortion is the 
root reason for the PRC’s external imbalances. These cost distortions have artificially 
lowered PRC production costs, raised profits, and improved their products’ international 
competitiveness which has not only stimulated the economy, but also brought about severe 
structural risks. We completed a crude estimation for factor cost distortions in the PRC 
during 2000–2009 which matched its current account surpluses quite well. In order to 
rebalance the economy, we recommend that the PRC should adopt a comprehensive reform 
package focusing on removing the factor market distortions. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The current account surplus of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as the high 
rate of its gross domestic product (GDP) has been at the center of numerous international 
economic policy debates in recent years. Some western politicians have blamed the PRC for 
its huge current account surpluses which they claim have  contributed to its undervalued 
currency. This external pressure has principally advocated for the appreciation of the yuan; 
this emphasis has  worsened  trade relations between the PRC  and countries with large 
current account deficits, especially the US, which has seen a widening of current account 
imbalances with the PRC in recent years.  
The surge in the PRC’s current account surplus in 2004 contributed a great deal to this 
global imbalance. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) demonstrated that this global imbalance was 
intimately connected with the financial crisis. They also pointed out that the PRC’s export 
success and dramatic current account surpluses fueled both a rapid growth rate and strong 
protectionist sentiment in destination markets. 
At the same time, both PRC economists and the PRC government were also very uneasy 
about the rapidly expanding external sector imbalances. Yu (2007) identified a number of 
reasons why the growing imbalances were not in the PRC’s interest and pointed out that 
persistent current account surpluses  meant that the PRC  as a low-income economy 
exported capital to rich countries. Rising external surpluses often worsened the PRC’s 
trading relations with its major trading partners.  Finally, rapid accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves also made the PRC vulnerable in face of US dollar adjustments.  
Since the current account surplus soared in 2004, the PRC economy has maintained a high 
growth rate. Its GDP rate has risen almost three times from 3.5% in 2004 to 10.8% in 2007. 
Due to the global economic crisis, the rate dropped to  9.7% in 2008 but the amount of 
current account surplus was 25 times higher in 2008 as it was in 2002 and reached US$426 
billion.  
























Source: CEIC Data Company. 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. 
The surge that occurred in 2004 and has lasted till now has raised numerous concerns and 
criticisms.  The  PRC  government  has tried numerous times  to reduce the imbalances, 
including appreciation of the yuan, reducing the export tax rebate,  and  increasing 
government procurement from abroad. These policies failed when faced with the continuing ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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discrepancies  in the current account surplus. The implied  message is that  maybe the 
government has not been aggressive enough, or it has not yet identified the root cause of 
the problem. 
What are the fundamental factors contributing to the PRC’s  growing current account 
surpluses? Explanations for the huge current account surpluses in the PRC can be grouped 
into six broad categories: measurement error, savings and investment gap, demographic 
transition, industry relocation, by-product of policies promoting strong growth, and exchange 
rate distortion. 
It should be noted that these explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For 
instance, the perceived exchange rate distortion might be applied as a part of the general 
policy supporting growth, and the effect of demographic transition is blended with the saving 
and investment gap.  
These explanations are helpful for understanding the PRC’s  growing external imbalance 
problem. The savings and investment gap hypothesis, however, is really an identity and 
does not offer proper insights into the problem. The by-product hypothesis and the industry 
relocation hypothesis are not conducive to generating specific policy recommendations to 
remedy the problem. Finally, the exchange rate hypothesis, while not controversial, could 
lead to superficial policy implications.  
In this paper, we argue that asymmetric market liberalization and the related factor market 
distortion is the reason for the PRC’s external imbalances. During the reform period, the 
government almost completely liberalized the goods markets. The factor markets, however, 
remain heavily distorted. These distortions have a general tendency of depressing factor 
prices and lowering production costs  which, taken together,  artificially increase producer 
incentives, raise investment returns, and improve the international competitiveness of PRC 
products. All these boost the PRC’s  exports. In addition, they also distort broad income 
distribution in favor of the government and the corporate sector,  but at the expense of 
household income. This weakens consumption and further boosts external sector surplus 
(Huang 2010). 
This paper is organized as follows; section two reviews the evolution and composition of the 
current account balances during the reform period and then offers a survey of the literature 
and a critical assessment of the six hypotheses proposed in previous studies. Section three 
presents an alternative hypothesis that the PRC’s growing current account surplus is mainly 
the result of factor market distortions. (We  have  elaborated the cost distortions in labor, 
capital, land, the energy market, and the environment with a crude estimation for the cost 
distortion in each factor market.)  Section four analyzes the past policy responses and 
recommends  that  in order to rebalance the economy, the  PRC  needs to adopt a 
comprehensive policy package that further liberalizes the factor markets and removes the 
cost distortions. The final section contains some concluding remarks on possible resolution 
of the PRC’s external sector imbalances. 
2.  CONTEMPORARY EXPLANATIONS OF THE PRC’S 
CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUSES  
2.1  Evolution of the PRC’s current account imbalances  
During more than 30 years of reform, the PRC incurred current account deficits in only the 
years  1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, and  1993.  It is, therefore, true that the PRC’s economic 
system does show a tendency towards current account surpluses. Until recently, however, 
those surpluses remained small relative to GDP. From 2003 to 2008, the surplus rose from 
US$45.9 billion to US$426.1 billion, an increase of more than 800% (see Figure 1). ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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While it is true that the PRC’s account surpluses in 2007 already amounted to more than 
50% of US current account deficits (thus likely requiring coordination with PRC efforts for 
any successful adjustment of US  external imbalances),  historical data do not definitively 
suggest that the PRC’s surplus was the original cause of the US deficit. US current account 
deficits first surged from 1.7% of GDP 1997 to 4.3% in 2000. During the same period, the 
PRC’s current account surpluses narrowed from 3.8% to 1.7%. One possible implication is 
that, while the US needs the PRC’s cooperation in rebalancing its own economy, perhaps it 
should also focus on its own structural reforms to remove the distortions. 
The PRC’s  current account surpluses have always been dominated by goods trade 
surpluses (see Figure 2). Before 2003, merchandised trade surpluses were greater than the 
overall current account surpluses. The relationship reversed after that because the 
combination of the remaining current account items also turned positive. These suggest that 
any policies  dealing with the external imbalance problem would have to address 
merchandise trade imbalances. 




Source: Economic Information Network Data Co., Ltd. 
Current transfers stayed in surplus during the past decade and rose from US$5.1 billion in 
1997 to US$45.8 billion in 2008 (see Figure  2).  Even in its peak year, however,  it only 
accounted  for slightly above 10%  of overall current account surpluses. Service trade 
remained in deficit, widening from US$3.4 billion in 1997 to US$11.8 billion in 2008. 
More interestingly, regarding goods trade imbalance, processing trade contributes almost 
100% of the total surplus (see Figure 3). General trade was more or less in balance during 
the past decade. This sheds light on the  sustainability of the PRC’s  external surpluses. 
Processing trade is mainly based on the PRC’s  cost advantages, particularly labor cost 
advantage. If such advantages disappear sometime in the future, then all the surpluses 
might also evaporate. This has important implications for what the government should do to 
deal with the current imbalance problems. ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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Figure 3:  PRC Goods Trade Surplus by Category, 1997–2007  
(US$ billion) 
 
Source: Economic Information Network Data Co., Ltd. 
We can further delineate goods trade surpluses by sectors. The first finding is that the PRC’s 
goods trade surpluses came entirely from industrial products (see Figure 4). Primary goods 
trade has been in deficit for at least the past decade, with aggregate deficits rising from 
US$4.7 billion in 1997 to US$284.9 billion in 2008. This was most clearly shown by the 
PRC’s  increasing imports of commodities and its growing influence in global commodity 
markets. 
Figure 4: PRC Current Account Balances by Sector, 1997–2008 
(US$ billion) 
   
Source: Economic Information Network Data Co., Ltd. 
A further look at the disaggregated industrial product trade data suggests that the  most 
dramatic increase in trade surpluses occurred in machinery and transport equipment (see 
Figure 4). Between 2003 and 2008, this sector’s trade balance improved from a small deficit 
to a huge surplus of US$231 billion, which was about 80%  of total merchandise trade 
surplus. Textile, rubber, and associated products, taken together, have been a strong export 
sector, but its surplus also picked up recently. Chemical and associated products is the only 
major sector which saw its trade deficits widen in recent years. 
Service trade deficits were only a small part of the current account picture. These deficits, 
however, were persistent and growing during the past ten years. Disaggregation of service 
trade data, however, also reveals very different stories for different components (see Figure 
5). For instance, travel and other business services have always been in surplus, while ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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transportation, insurance services, and royalties and licenses have been the major deficit 
items. 




Source: WIND Data Company. 
3.  A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The PRC’s external imbalances have been a popular topic for both economic analyses and 
policy debate (Yu 2007; Goldstein and Lardy 2009). The importance of this issue has been 
further underscored in the wake of the US financial crisis, especially in discussions of global 
rebalancing (Kawai and Zhai 2009). 
Before examining possible remedies, we need to understand the fundamental causes of the 
PRC’s current account surplus. The literature has produced a long list of explanations, which 
may be broadly grouped into six categories: measurement error, savings and investment 
gap, demographic transition, industrial relocation, by-product of promoting strong economic 
growth, and exchange rate distortion. We review these hypotheses in this section and then 
turn to an alternative hypothesis in the next section. 
3.1  Measurement error 
The quality of PRC statistics has been a widely discussed issue among economists. In a 
recent paper, however, Zhang (2009)  identified another possible measurement error: 
overestimation of the PRC’s  current account surpluses in recent years.  Zhang’s  key 
proposition was that there were capital inflows, which would otherwise be prohibited given 
capital account controls, disguised in the form of export revenues or income transfers. 
Indeed, the surge of current account surpluses after 2004 coincided with reform of the yuan 
exchange rate policy in mid-2005. Data on non-deliverable forward (NDF) markets confirmed 
that expectations for yuan appreciation increased from 2005. This probably led to increases 
in disguised capital inflows from then on. 
By regressing current account surpluses on NDF markets’ expectation for yuan appreciation, 
Zhang computed a portion of current account surpluses that could be explained by currency 
expectation. By assuming this portion as disguised capital inflows, Zhang calculated the ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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“actual” current account surpluses for the period 2003–2007, by stripping the disguised 
capital inflows from the official data (see Figure 6).  
Figure 6: Current Account Surpluses: Official and Adjusted, 2003–2008 
(% GDP) 
 
Source: CEIC Data Company and Zhang (2009). 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Zhang’s estimates suggest that the official data on current account surpluses were over-
reported by 2 to 3 percentage points in recent years. For instance, according to the official 
data, the current account surplus was 10.8% of GDP in 2007. According to Zhang’s 
estimation, however, the actual surplus was probably only around 7.5%.  
Identification of possible measurement error in current account data was a very important 
step in correctly assessing the problem. The techniques applied for stripping non-current 
account items, especially their reliability and accuracy, might be subject to criticism. The 
logic behind such exercises, however, is sound. Given the PRC’s capital account controls, 
“hot money” flows always existed and were, at times, large and volatile. Anecdotal evidence 
confirms that “disguised” capital inflows to the PRC accelerated after its exchange rate policy 
reforms were enacted in mid-2005 and persisted  until mid-2008 when the economy was 
badly hit by the global crisis. 
However, data adjustments still do not change the fact that the PRC’s  “actual” current 
account surpluses are large compared to other large economies, nor do they change the 
trend of the growing imbalances. Therefore, we still need to find satisfactory explanations for 
this unusual phenomenon and, better yet, to find effective policy solutions. 
3.2  Savings and investment gap 
The current account imbalance is, by definition, the difference between savings  and 
investment. The PRC’s investment share of GDP rose steadily from about 36% in 1999 to 
almost 48% in 2009 (see Figure 7). However, savings rates increased even faster, from 38% 
to 54% during the same period. Clearly, savings played a very significant role in the recent 
surge of the PRC’s current account surpluses, with some economists seeking to explain the 
PRC’s large external imbalances by examining the structural factors behind its savings and 
investment behavior. ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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Source: Economic Information Network Data Co., Ltd. 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. 
Feenstra, et al (1999), claim that the major cause of the PRC’s current account surplus was 
its high household savings rate. They also argue that this was, in turn, generated by the 
PRC’s demographic profile, the absence of social insurance for the bulk of the population, 
and the post-1978 appearance of investment-motivated savings in response to the scarcity 
of formal intermediation to finance investment in the non-state sector. They suggested that 
import liberalization would reduce the PRC’s current account surplus. 
Bernanke  (2007)  attempted to explain  US  current account deficits by focusing on the 
“savings glut” in emerging Asia and oil-producing countries. Specifically, he pointed out that 
while rates of both savings and investment rose in the PRC from 1996–2004, the savings 
rate increased faster, which led to an increase in its current account surplus by $60 billion. 
Bernanke’s policy prescriptions referred to greater financial and institutional development in 
the long run. 
Chinn and Ito (2007) tested this proposition by applying a computer model that controlled for 
institutional factors. According to their study, the PRC  experienced  a highly impressive 
32.4%  increase in private credit creation (net change in the weighted world average) 
between 1996 and 2004. This development alone led to an increase in national savings of 
1.7%, but also to an increase in investment of 2.4%. Therefore, financial development had a 
negative effect on net savings through a faster increase in investment, as opposed to a 
reduction in savings . 
Zhou (2009) explained that the PRC’s high gross saving rate is related to its unique income 
distribution pattern. Household savings as a share of GDP was stable at around 20% over 
the period 1992–2007. Corporate savings, however, were about 22.9% of GDP in 2007, 
roughly doubling their share in 1992. Zhou suggested that, given the current income 
distribution pattern, the PRC should increase the investment rate, in addition to lowering the 
saving rate, in order to reduce its current account surplus.  Lin (2010) also stressed the 
decomposition of the PRC’s savings rate (see Figure 8), and concluded that the rapid growth 
in corporate savings was caused by the overconcentration of the financial system, the low 
taxation on national resources, and the monopoly power of the state-led industry. ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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Figure 8: Composition of National Savings in PRC, 1992–2007 
(% of GDP) 
 
Source: Lin (2010). 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. 
Corden  (2006)  developed the so-called “parking” theory to explain large current account 
surpluses in high-savings developing economies. He argued that it is perfectly rational to 
invest some of the extra savings abroad given the inefficiency of both the financial system 
and the public sector at home. These savings are “parked”  overseas until domestic 
investment allocation improves. 
The savings-investment gap explanation is really a restatement of an identity in economics 
textbooks and therefore is of little dispute. But the common belief that Chinese households 
save too much is plainly wrong. The household savings rate has been very stable for the 
past 15 years, fluctuating slightly around 30%. This rate is certainly high compared to those 
in industrial economies, but it is not unusual compared with the PRC’s East Asian neighbors. 
The fact that the savings  rate has changed little in  over a decade  also suggests that 
household savings was probably not the key cause of growing current account surpluses in 
recent years. 
Zhou  (2009)  was right in pointing out the unique corporate saving behavior and its 
importance to the macroeconomic picture. His policy prescription was to increase  the 
investment rate which can certainly be effective in reducing the current account imbalance. 
The only problem is that the PRC’s investment share of GDP is already close to 45%, an 
unusually high level even in the East Asian context. The PRC probably has limited room now 
for a further increase in the investment rate. 
Finally, applicability of the “parking”  theory to the PRC  is also questionable. Investment 
returns, on average, are much higher in the PRC than in the rest of the world. Otherwise it 
would be difficult to understand the massive inflows of foreign investment into the PRC 
during the past decades. The funds parked overseas are held by the central bank, not the 
private sector. Retaining  higher returns  was never a key priority for the central bank’s 
management of funds parked overseas. Therefore, while the “parking” theory could apply to 
many developing economies, it does not appear to be relevant to the situation in the PRC. ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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3.3  Demographic transition 
The PRC has been implementing family planning policies since the 1970s, which stipulate 
one child per family. These policies, after more than 30 years, have generated important 
consequences for the economy. For instance, the male to female ratio is now an astonishing 
1.26 and the ratio of the young, dependent population also dropped steadily which likely 
affects the savings behavior of the population. 
Using panel data from  25  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
countries between 1971 and 2002, Andersson and Osterholm (2006) confirmed that the 
demographic structure  in the PRC  explained much about its exchange rate, which was 
consistent with the lifecycle hypothesis. They found that an  active  populace  has  a 
depreciative effect on the real exchange rate while a retired population exerts appreciation 
pressures on the currency. 
In an empirical study, Zhu (2007) argued that the PRC’s abundant labor supply was behind 
its labor cost advantage and huge current account surpluses. Ma and Zhou (2009) examined 
causes of the PRC’s  increasing external wealth. They identified  demographic transition, 
especially having a labor force growing temporarily faster than the population, as one of the 
reasons behind the PRC’s external imbalances. 
During 1985–2007, the youth dependency ratio fell by half. During the same period, the 
dependency ratio of the elderly  population rose slightly. The overall dependency ratio, 
however, dropped. Ma and Zhou found that the increase in the youth dependency ratio by 
nearly 20% contributed to the increase of the PRC’s net foreign asset position by 90% of 
GDP. 
An important point is that the so-called population dividend may not last forever. The World 
Bank (2008) demonstrated that aging would affect savings and investment. Initially, aging 
may increase a country’s saving, which, again could boost its current account positions. 
Once the society ages, however, the savings ratio could drop and the current account could 
deteriorate. Cai and Wang (2007) believe that the PRC’s  labor cost advantage is 
disappearing very rapidly. 
3.4  Industry relocation 
A new economic trend emerging in Asia is the increased relocation of industries to the PRC. 
This process started in the textile and clothing industries in the 1980s, continued in the white 
goods sectors in the 1990s,  and is now occurring in information technology, 
pharmaceuticals, and other more sophisticated industries. Industry relocation accelerated 
after the PRC’s World Trade Organization accession in late 2001. Many economists argued 
that industry relocation was one of the key factors behind the PRC’s growing current account 
surpluses. 
As early as 1994, Lardy (1994) noted that increases in the PRC’s trade surplus with the US 
were, to a large extent, accompanied by decreases in other East Asian economies’ trade 
surpluses. Later, he further argued that the US–PRC  trade deficits were a global issue 
(Lardy 2006). In the processing industries, usually 60%–70% of the value of manufactured 
products was imported content. As an assembler, the PRC  is the last stage of the 
international supply chain. 
Greenspan (2005) associated the US current account deficits with a corresponding widening 
of external surpluses in some of its major trading partners. Because the last processing and 
export procedures increasingly concentrated in the PRC, the US  deficits with the PRC 
replaced deficits with other Asian economies. 
Li and Li (2006) looked at the industry relocation issue from a broader perspective, arguing 
that, over the years, the PRC’s industries evolved from agriculture to manufacturing, in the ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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process  benefiting from cheap labor and an  influx of foreign investment. Transfer of 
production facilities, alongside inflows of foreign direct investment, contributed to the PRC’s 
growing current account surplus. 
Relocation of industries and associated migration to trade surplus from other Asian 
economies to the PRC is, again, a reasonable explanation of the PRC’s growing external 
sector imbalances. This hypothesis, however, fails to explain why the PRC became a global 
manufacturing center so quickly. Were there unique factors behind the PRC’s unusual cost 
advantage and industrial competitiveness? The relocation hypothesis also does not yield 
practical policy recommendations for dealing with the imbalance problem. 
3.5  By-product of policies promoting strong growth 
The  PRC  government’s policy bias in favor of strong economic growth is well known. 
Therefore, policymakers naturally pay closer attention to production than anything else. 
Some economists claim that the large external sector surplus was a by-product of the 
policies supporting growth. 
Fan and Huifeng (2008) argued that a key challenge facing the government is employment 
pressure, since the PRC still has huge surplus labor in the countryside and at the same time 
does not have well-developed social welfare systems. Job creation is a top priority since it is 
the basis for social security. The widely accepted 8% growth target, for instance, was 
formulated based on needed job creation. Therefore, the government sometimes boosts 
production at whatever costs. 
Corden (2009) argued that the PRC’s current account surplus and especially its rise since 
2005 is, in fact, a by-product of various developments, such as productivity improvements, 
and a variety of policies, such as exchange rate policy. Cordon argued that there were two 
parts to PRC exchange rate policy: one part is exchange rate protection for the export sector 
by currency undervaluation, and the other is maintaining a stable exchange rate. Another 
policy orientation is to build up  foreign exchange reserves as a form of self-insurance, 
especially after the Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998. These inevitably led to large current 
account surpluses as a by-product. 
Yu (2007) identified the government’s export promotion policy, which includes the so-called 
self-balancing regulation, exchange rate policy, and tax rebates, as a contributing factor to 
the current account surplus. For instance, for a long time, the government demanded that 
foreign investors guarantee the self-balancing of foreign exchange for important investment 
projects. Therefore, foreign direct investment (FDI) must be export-oriented. As a result, 
when FDI was introduced, corresponding deficits were minimized. 
This hypothesis itself is probably not controversial. The government has room to narrow 
external surpluses by reducing policy measures supporting exports and economic growth. 
The question is how realistic it is for the government to give up its policy emphasis on 
growth. 
3.6  Exchange rate policy 
The exchange rate policy has been most frequently referenced in public debates about the 
PRC’s external imbalances. An undervalued currency is often associated with higher exports 
and lower imports, which then lead to a large trade surplus or current account surplus. This 
was probably the most obvious logic behind foreign politicians’ criticisms about the PRC’s 
exchange rate policy. 
Goldstein and Lardy  (2006) used  the “underlying balance” approach to evaluate the 
misalignment of the yuan. The essence of their approach was to calculate the needed 
adjustments in the yuan’s real effective exchange rate (REER) in order to retain a “normal” ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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current account balance. They concluded that the PRC’s  undervalued currency had 
contributed to growing trade surpluses and, at least in some years, to very large portfolio 
capital inflows, which appeared motivated by an expectation of appreciation. 
It must be pointed out that the methodology applied by Goldstein and Lardy does not reveal 
how the exchange rate policy caused current account surpluses. Instead, they infer currency 
undervaluation from current account imbalances. 
Lu and Dai (2005) partly filled this gap by examining the long-run relationship between the 
PRC’s international trade and the yuan’s REER, applying data for the period 1994–2003. 
Results of their co-integrated vector autoregression (VAR) model suggested that the yuan’s 
REER had significant impacts on the PRC’s exports and imports. These confirmed that the 
exchange rate was indeed an important determinant of the current account imbalances.  
Findings of empirical studies, however,  are not uniform. For instance, Li and Li (2006) 
discovered no statistically significant effect of either the nominal exchange rate of the yuan 
or its real exchange rate on the PRC’s exports to and imports from the US. Instead, they 
found that changes in FDI inflows had a significant effect on exports to the US.  
Exchange rate policy was probably the most reasonable explanation for the PRC’s current 
account surplus, at least on the surface. The  policy recommendations derived from it, 
however, might not be as reasonable. A common policy prescription is that the PRC should 
let its currency rise by a certain margin in order to eliminate the external imbalances. It is 
unrealistic to expect the PRC government will permit the currency to appreciate sharply in 
the near term. Many PRC officials are concerned about the negative consequences of sharp 
currency appreciation, given their own interpretation of Japanese economic stagnation 
following the Plaza Accord. 
An alternative recommendation is for the PRC to increase exchange rate flexibility. This is 
probably good advice by itself. But can a more flexible exchange rate regime automatically 
eliminate current account imbalance? The answer may be no, at least according to 
international experiences. 
In a study applying a data set covering 170 countries over the period 1971–2005, Chinn and 
Wei  (2009)  found that there was no strong, robust,  or  monotonic  relationship between 
exchange rate regime flexibility and the rate of current account reversion, even after 
controlling the degree of economic development, and  the degree of trade and capital 
account openness. This conclusion can in fact be observed by simply surveying the data: 
there is no systemic relationship between a country’s current account position and its 
exchange rate regime flexibility. 
While strongly recommending an  increase in exchange rate flexibility, Yu  (2007)  also 
cautioned expectations of significant adjustments to the current account surplus as a result 
of the exchange rate policy reform. 
So the notion that greater flexibility in a de facto nominal exchange rate regime implies 
speedier adjustment in the current account is just based on faith, and cannot be supported 
by data. The reason behind the disconnect lies in the fact that what mattered for current 
account adjustment was the real, as opposed to  nominal,  exchange rate. In theory, the 
government can artificially revalue the currency by a big margin in order to strengthen the 
real effective exchange rate substantially. But this is probably difficult for the government to 
adopt given corresponding structural adjustments the economy has to go through. 
4.  FACTOR MARKET DISTORTIONS: AN ALTERNATIVE 
HYPOTHESIS 
We now present an alternative hypothesis for the PRC’s  large  current account surplus-
asymmetry liberalization of product and factor markets. We first formulated this theory when ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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we attempted to explain the very unique macroeconomic phenomenon during the PRC’s 
reform period: the  combination of both extraordinary economic growth and deteriorating 
structural risks (Huang 2010). 
The purpose of this exercise is not to replace the existing hypotheses. In a way, our 
hypothesis and the hypotheses presented within the literature may be supplementary and 
even overlapping. But as we will elaborate later, the factor market distortion hypothesis not 
only offers a fundamental explanation about the external imbalance but also produces a 
systemic policy prescription for curing the problem. 
4.1  Asymmetric market liberalization 
During the reform period, the PRC government focused on reform of the product markets, 
including abandoning policy interventions in domestic markets and liberalizing trade of goods 
and services. Today, free markets determine the prices of more than 95% of products. 
In contrast, factor markets, including markets for labor, capital, land, energy,  and the 
environment, remain highly distorted. For instance, many employers of migrant workers still 
do not make social welfare contributions for their employees. Outside the property sector, 
land prices are artificially determined by the government. These distortions generally push 
factor prices and, therefore, production costs are below levels that otherwise would be in a 
market environment. 
Cost distortions in the PRC are equivalent to production and investment subsidies. They 
artificially increase production profits and raise investment returns. Both PRC citizens and 
foreigners invest massively in the PRC given its cheap labor, cheap capital, cheap land, and 
cheap energy. Producers enjoy extraordinary profits that do not exist in other countries.  
Without a doubt, the fundamental reason why the PRC achieved strong growth of exports, 
investment,  and production is the reform and open-door policy. But cost distortion, or 
subsidy  equivalent, further lifts producers’ profitability, investors’ returns,  and  the 
international competitiveness of PRC products to even higher levels. Perhaps this is why the 
PRC’s  investment  and  production  have been  unusually strong during the reform period, 
particularly during the past years. 
Meanwhile, these cost distortions are also equivalent to taxes on owners of these factors, 
mainly households. They reduce households’ income and depress consumer spending. 
Boosted investment and depressed consumption leads to imbalances between domestic and 
external demand. Low factor prices also cause distorted industrial structures, such as 
outsized heavy industry as a result of the cheap cost of capital, in addition to waste and 
inefficiency. 
It is thus easy to predict that factor market distortion leads to unusually large external 
imbalances, especially large trade surpluses  and current account surpluses. The cost 
distortion improves exporters’ profitability and exports’ competitiveness in the international 
markets. Depressed consumption also widens the savings and income gap and, therefore, 
further boosts external sector surpluses. 
Some distortions in factor markets, such the government’s controls over energy prices and 
land use fees for manufacturing investors, are deliberate policy measures to support 
economic growth. Other distortions, such as the household registration system limiting labor 
mobility and regulations of interest rates, are phenomena found during economic transition. 
But they are in one way or another related to the government policy preference favoring 
strong growth. 
Indeed, this is not the first time that the PRC government has adopted measures distorting 
production costs in order to achieve rapid economic growth. In the pre-reform period, for 
instance, the authorities devised a set of institutions to ensure rapid development of urban 
industries. When the government embarked on urban industrialization, it lacked a reliable ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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supply of funds. Agriculture was the largest economic sector at that time. The purpose of 
that set of policies was to deliver high profits in urban industries, which could be reinvested 
to accelerate urban industrialization. 
This first step was to depress agricultural prices, which could reduce production costs in 
urban industries by lowering both input cost and labor cost. Therefore, the government 
introduced a “unified purchase and marketing system” for agricultural products. Under this 
system, the state purchased agricultural products from farmers at below-market prices. In 
order to ensure that farmers would sell their products to the state, the authorities took the 
second step by abolishing all free markets. To make sure that farmers would produce 
according to the central plans, the authorities took the third step of collectivizing agriculture, 
handing all agricultural decision power to production team leaders who were selected by the 
government.  Finally,  in order to guarantee that farmers would participate in collective 
farming, the authorities took the fourth step of introducing the household registration system, 
effectively prohibiting farmers from leaving their villages. 
This system of urban industrialization policy was, for a while, quite successful. But it failed in 
the end. Otherwise,  the PRC  would not have  had  to start economic reforms in the late 
1970s. There were two main reasons why the pre-reform policy system did not work. First, 
since there was no free market for products, resource allocation was inefficient. All factories 
produced according to the central plans. In the end, the industry produced lots of heavy 
industry products which had no demand. At the same time, there was significant shortage of 
consumer goods. Second, since there was no autonomy or  incentive at the firm or individual 
levels, production efficiency was quite low. Shirking was a common phenomenon in urban 
factories and rural collectives. 
Both of these problems have been resolved with the beginning of economic reforms which is 
why the new policy system has been much more successful in supporting economic growth. 
But the new system has also given rise to the structural risks, such as imbalances between 
investment and consumption, and between domestic and external demand. 
It should be clear by now that the factor market distortion hypothesis is related to some of 
the existing hypotheses reviewed earlier. For instance,  the  depressing of domestic 
consumption also contributes to the savings and investment gap. Reduction of production 
costs accelerates relocation of industries to the PRC. The cost distortion, intentionally or 
accidentally, is driven by the government’s growth-centered policy strategy. Finally, currency 
undervaluation is a form of underpriced capital. 
4.2  Remaining distortions in factor markets 
Introduction of free markets was the central theme of economic reforms during the past three 
decades. But prices of almost all factors, including labor, land, capital, energy,  and the 
environment, remain highly distorted. 
Labor market. The PRC is known for its abundant and cheap labor, which was a key factor 
behind its success in labor-intensive manufacturing exports. But PRC labor costs may be 
distorted for two interrelated reasons: segmentation of rural and urban labor markets and 
underdevelopment of social welfare systems. 
Labor market segmentation was largely a result of the household registration system (HRS) 
introduced in the pre-reform period. The policy requires that people, whether urban or rural, 
stay where they were born their entire lives. Migration is possible only if approved by the 
government. The effectiveness of this system has weakened in recent years, as evidenced 
by large number of migrant workers roaming the cities. Local authorities in Shandong, 
Henan, and Hainan also experimented with doing away with the restrictions on rural-urban 
migration.  ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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By and large, however, the HRS still erects important barriers for labor mobility. The location 
of an individual’s household registration makes a significant difference. Urban residents are 
entitled to social welfare benefits, such as medical insurance,  pension, unemployment 
support, and education, although most of these systems are still underdeveloped. Migrant 
workers, however, cannot access any of them, even if they have been working in cities for 
years. 
The most important area of underpayment  is social welfare contribution. Were  urban 
employers to make social welfare contributions for their migrant workers, their payrolls would 
rise by about 35%–40%, which includes contribution to pensions (20% of payroll), medical 
insurance (6%), unemployment benefits (2%), work injury insurance (1%), maternity benefit 
(0.8%), and housing entitlement (5%–10%).
1
Capital market. Distortions in capital markets exist at two levels. Domestically, the financial 
system remains repressed, as  evidenced by highly regulated interest rates and state 
influences on credit allocation. Externally, capital account controls are more restrictive on 
outflows than on inflows. The currency is generally undervalued, at least during the past 15 
years. 
  
The PRC’s  financial system, especially its banking sector, has gone through a  major 
transformation.  Financial intermediation, however,  remains overly dependent on banks, 
especially the large state-owned commercial banks. The government influences lending 
decisions. Despite significant reforms during the past years, including introduction of foreign-
strategic investors and public listings, most large banks are still majority-owned by the state 
and their top executives are still appointed by the government. 
The PRC  still maintains interest rate regulation. Despite numerous reforms giving banks 
more flexibility in determining the actual rates, the People’s Bank of China still maintains 
floors for lending rates and ceilings for deposit rates, ensuring minimum interest spread in 
order to facilitate reforms of the commercial banks. In reality, however, the actual lending 
rates have always been very close to the benchmark rates.  
These financial repressions likely reduced capital efficiency and therefore capital costs. A 
World Bank study suggested that financial liberalization in emerging market economies often 
would raise domestic interest rates by a couple of percentage points (Caprio, Atiyas, and 
Hanson 1994). 
Changes in the exchange rate policy offer another example of cost distortion. Today, most 
economists believe that the yuan is still undervalued, although they disagree on the degree 
of undervaluation (Goldstein and Lardy 2008). 
The larger gap between nominal GDP growth potential and long-term government bond 
yields in the PRC, relative to the gaps in other Asian economies, also suggest that the 
PRC’s capital is excessively cheap. At the end of 2008, the difference was 10 percentage 
points in the PRC, compared with 6.5 in India, 6.2 in Thailand, 5.7 in Malaysia, and 2.6 in the 
Republic of  Korea.
2
Markets for land, energy and the environment. In the PRC, land is owned by the state in 
the cities and by collectives in the countryside. Recently, local governments began to sell 
land use rights to property developers through negotiations and auctions. However, there is 
no market mechanism for determining prices for industrial land use. They are often set by 
the government departments through negotiation. In order to attract investment and promote 
growth, regional governments often offer land use rights to investors at discounted or even 
 Compared with other Asian economies, the PRC’s  nominal growth 
potential was the highest, but its Treasury yield was among the lowest. 
                                                 
1 These estimates for a typical year were provided to the author by Fan Zhai, a former official of the PRC’s 
Ministry of Finance in 2002. 
2 The difference is calculated by subtracting 5-year government bond yield from the economy’s nominal GDP 
growth potential forecast, which was estimated by Citigroup economists. ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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zero cost  rates. Local governments sometimes compete with each other in offering 
preferential policies to attract investment. In recent years, the average fees collected from 
negotiated granting of land use rights were only about 16%  of those collected through 
auctions. 
Prices of key energy products, such as oil, gas, and electricity, are also regulated by the 
state. Electricity tariffs are set by the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC), although the authorities sometimes held public hearings to improve  decision-
making quality. Tariffs are different for agricultural, industrial, and residential uses. Electricity 
prices have been under pressure for upward adjustment in recent years as costs of oil and 
coal rose significantly.  
In 1998, in an important step of oil price liberalization, the State Council announced a 
formula linking domestic prices to the weighted average of prices in New York, Singapore, 
and Rotterdam. The NDRC would adjust domestic prices, with a couple of months’ delay, if 
the international weighted average moved by more than 8%. In 2000, the NDRC raised oil 
prices seven times in order to bring domestic prices closer to international levels.  
However, when international prices moved violently, the NDRC became reluctant to follow 
for fear of disrupting economic growth. For instance, when international crude prices 
reached their recent peak at close to US$150 per barrel in 2008, the equivalent domestic 
prices were only around US$80 per barrel. But oil price distortions are highly volatile, given 
the State Council’s formula and fluctuations in the international markets. 
The PRC has introduced a series of environmental laws and regulations. Their enforcement, 
however, has been rather random, as the government emphasizes  economic growth. 
Pollution of air, water, and land, the most visible negative by-product of the PRC’s rapid 
economic growth,  has not only affected productivity but also generated serious health 
consequences. Environmental degradation in the PRC  has  contributed to global climate 
change, as evidenced by the rapid melting of ice on the Himalayas. It also has led to regular 
drought in the north and frequent floods in the south.  
According to a joint study by National Bureau of Statistics  and the State Agency for 
Environmental Protection, an incomplete count of  the  costs of environmental damage 
amounted to about 3.05% of GDP in 2004 (Huang 2007). Since producers do not always 
fully compensate for  their damages to the environment, short-term production costs  are 
reduced at the expense of the long-term development of the whole economy and society. 
4.3  Crude estimation of factor market distortion   
A critical question here is if cost distortions are a good explanatory variable for the recent 
current account surplus surge. Any reviews of policy changes would suggest that, despite 
slow progress, factor market controls have gradually become less strict. Therefore, it might 
appear to contradict the fact that current account surpluses widened sharply in recent years. 
In order to gauge the significance of such factor market distortions, we intend to make some 
crude quantitative estimation. Huang (2010) made one of the first attempts at measurement 
and found the distortions totaling 2.1 trillion yuan  in 2008, or about 7%  of GDP. His 
estimation, however, was made only for one year, which is of limited use since we are trying 
to explain changes in current account surpluses in recent years. Therefore, we extend the 
estimation by both improving the methodologies and extending the period to include 9 years 
from 2000 to 2008. Based on obtained estimates and other available information, we also 
made preliminary attempts to estimate a number for 2009, which is subject to revision in the 
future. 
The estimation results are summarized in Table 1, with more detailed explanations of the 
estimation methods included in the Appendix at the end of the paper. These results reveal 
several important findings. First, of all the factor market distortions, capital market distortion ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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was by far the most important single item. Capital  producer subsidy equivalents  (PSEs) 
would contribute about 40% of total PSEs on average. This explains the overinvestment 
problem persistent in the PRC and also rapid development of capital-intensive industries 
despite continued job market pressures. 
Table 1: Estimated Producer Subsidy Equivalents of Factor Market Distortions in PRC, 
2000–2009 
(% GDP) 
  Labor  Capital  Land  Energy  Environ  Total  C/A 
2000  0.1  4.1  0.5  0.0  3.8   8.5  1.7 
2001  0.2  3.9  0.5  0.0  3.5   8.1  1.3 
2002  0.8  3.9  0.4  0.0  3.3   8.4  2.4 
2003  1.0  3.8  1.1  0.0  3.3   9.2  2.8 
2004  2.0  3.1  0.9  0.6  3.0   9.5  3.5 
2005  2.4  3.0  1.3  1.7  3.0  11.4  7.2 
2006  2.7  3.1  2.0  1.6  2.8  12.2  9.0 
2007  3.2  3.6  1.2  1.6  2.4  12.0  10.8 
2008  3.6  3.4  1.0  0.7  1.9  10.6  9.6 
2009*  2.7  3.5  0.9  0.7  1.8   9.6  5.8 
Source: Authors’ estimation. Please refer to the Appendix for detailed estimation methods. 
Notes: C/A = current account balance; GDP = gross domestic product. * Estimates for 2009 are very preliminary 
based on estimates for other years and available information for 2009 and are subject to major revision when new 
information is available. 
Second, labor market distortions actually picked up in recent years despite the loosening of 
household registration system controls and increasing rural-urban migration. This was a 
result of both the rising number of migrant workers and persistent, even widening, income 
gaps between migrant workers and urban workers. Indeed, statistics show that while labor 
demand increased in recent years, migrant workers’ pay did not keep pace with urban 
workers, especially when social welfare benefit contributions are included. 
Third, energy cost distortion fluctuated widely across years, reflecting volatilities in 
international oil prices. The PRC already adopted a price mechanism that would  closely 
track changes in international energy prices. Authorities, however,  would hold down 
domestic prices when international prices surged  rapidly. Therefore, the  energy cost 
distortions measured in this study were not a major problem until several years ago. 
Fourth, environmental cost distortion was the only item that showed consistent improvement. 
This might be a surprise to some, at least initially, but individual and aggregate pollution 
indicators did confirm fewer emissions in recent years. 
Finally, the aggregate estimates of cost distortions or PSEs match the current imbalance 
data surprisingly well (see Figure 9). Given a limited number of observations, we are not 
able to conduct any statistical analyses to test correlation or causality between the two sets 
of data. But these estimates at least provide partial evidence that factor market distortions 
were possibly an important reason behind the PRC’s  large current account surpluses. 
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Source: CEIC Data Company and authors’ estimation. 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product 
The trends  of  both  liberalization and recent increases in PSEs are not necessarily 
contradictory. For example, even if the factor market is gradually liberalized, cost distortions 
may rise dramatically as long as the distorted factor prices cannot keep pace with shadow 
market prices.  
If PSEs provide any guide for the future development of the current account, then we may 
argue that the worst of the external imbalance is probably over. Factor market distortions as 
a share of GDP already peaked in 2006, followed by a peak of current account surplus as a 
share of GDP in 2007. Therefore, the narrowing of the current account surpluses in 2008 
and 2009 was not entirely caused by weakening external demand. Unless cost distortions 
rebound again, current account surpluses may stay at relatively lower levels in the coming 
years. 
Since labor cost distortion is the most challenged factor in policy debates, we also plot factor 
cost distortions by excluding labor from the calculation. While both levels and curvature of 
the estimates changed somewhat, significant increase in factor distortion from 2004 
remained the case (see Figure 10).  ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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Source: CEIC Data Company and authors’ estimation. 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. 
We should acknowledge that we did not conduct a causality test due to data limits, and, 
therefore, cannot claim statistically that these distortions caused the PRC’s current account 
surplus. We nonetheless try to offer an alternative but also supplementary explanation for 
the PRC’s current account surpluses, especially for the recent surge. However, even if there 
is reverse causality between the cost distortion and the current account surpluses, or even if 
they are all the products of the PRC’s promoting growth policies, we may argue that the 
proper and feasible therapy is still adopting a comprehensive package focusing on removing 
the factor cost distortions.  
First, these two problems are partially related. The possibility of reverse causality, i.e., that 
the current account surpluses are the reason for the factor cost distortions, is closely related 
to the PRC’s promoting growth strategy. Second, since the aim is to rebalance the economy 
rather than stop the growth, we cannot suggest the PRC abandon promoting growth strategy. 
In this paper, we recommend that the PRC should put more emphasis on the factor market 
liberalization, thus adjusting the growth strategy to rebalance its external sector.  
5.  POLICY OPTIONS FOR REBALANCING THE EXTERNAL 
SECTOR 
The findings of this study have important policy implications. If cost distortions (along with 
other factors such as industrial relocation and policies pursuing strong GDP growth) were a 
fundamental cause of the PRC’s current account surplus, removal of these distortions should 
be a part of the solution. So far, however, this has not been a central strategy for rebalancing 
the PRC’s economy. 
5.1  Past policies rebalancing the external sector 
When the Wen Jiabao government first took office in early 2003, it immediately identified 
structural imbalances as a key threat to the PRC’s growth model. The Premier and other ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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senior leaders repeatedly pointed out that the existing growth pattern was unstable and 
unsustainable.
3
One of the imbalance problems was too much reliance on exports for economic growth. The 
export share of GDP rose from around 10% in the 1980s to above 20% in the early 21st 
century. While such an export dependency ratio is not particularly high compared with other 
small, open Asian economies, it is extraordinary in comparison with other large economies 
like the US and Japan. The potential risk is that the PRC would probably face hurdles in 
sustaining export growth in normal years, let alone in those times when external demand 
weakens significantly. 
 
More worrying is its growing trade and current account surpluses. While the current account 
balances always fluctuated, its surpluses rose quickly back to 3%  of GDP in the years 
following the Asian financial crisis. Persistent and rising current account surpluses indicate 
the PRC’s inefficient use of capital: as a low-income country, the PRC lends to the world 
market. More importantly, the large current account surplus every year adds  further 
pressures on the economy such as accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, excess 
liquidity in the domestic market, high inflation risks, and greater expectations for currency 
appreciation. 
In order to reduce these and other structural risks, the Wen Jiabao government adopted 
several policy measures to rebalance the economy and improve growth quality. One type of 
policy attempts to directly address the surplus problem. This includes reduction of the export 
tax rebate and appreciation of the currency. Export tax rebate policy was introduced in 1994 
to exempt exports from value-added taxes. The government, however, adjusts the rates from 
time to time either as an industrial policy or as a macroeconomic instrument. For instance, in 
June 2007, the Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation lowered the rebates 
for a list of exports in order to both improve export structure and slow export growth. 
The other type of measures attacks the imbalance problem indirectly. For instance, the 
government abolished agricultural taxes, increased spending on rural infrastructure, and 
strengthened social welfare systems. All these measures aimed at boosting domestic 
demand  in order to  reduce export growth and narrow the  current account surplus. The 
authorities also raised interest rates and tightened controls over large investment projects in 
order to slow the building-up of export capacity. 
While all these efforts were probably useful and achieved some results, as a whole they 
failed to contain external imbalances. In fact, between 2003 and 2007, export share of GDP 
rose further, from 26.6% to 35.4%. And current account surplus surged from 2.8% of GDP to 
10.8% during the same period. An important reason why the government policies have not 
succeeded so far was that they did not deal with the root cause of the problem, i.e., the 
distorted incentive structure. If capital is too cheap, then tighter controls by the NDRC on 
investment projects are not likely to be effective alleviating the overinvestment problem. 
5.2  Social welfare systems and the currency 
Economists also proposed some fundamental solutions to the PRC’s  current account 
imbalance problem. One is the development of a social welfare system, and another is an 
appreciation of the yuan. 
The idea of developing a  social welfare system is based on the belief that insufficient 
consumption was the cause behind the savings and investment gap. In the late 1990s, the 
PRC government dismantled the state-dominated social welfare systems and began to build 
market-based systems. Building new systems,  however,  is difficult and the transition 
significantly increased uncertainty. Households probably increased their savings  for their 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, reports on Premier Wen Jiabao’s press conference on 16 March 2007, following the annual 
National People’s Congress meeting. ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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own future protection. Therefore, improved social welfare systems might be able to reduce 
savings and increase consumption, effectively narrowing the savings and investment gap.  
This policy advice is reasonable. After all, social welfare systems are a critical part of a 
developed market system. It is unclear, however, if improvement in social welfare system 
alone is sufficient to reduce the external imbalances. First, as Governor Zhou (2009) already 
pointed out, household savings as a share of GDP has been relatively stable for the past 20 
years, fluctuating slightly around 20%. What drove the significant increase in the national 
savings ratio, which is now well above 50%, was rising corporate savings, from 11.3% of 
GDP in 1992 to 22.9% in 2007. Therefore, improved social welfare systems may be able to 
reduce household savings, but their impact on overall national savings is likely to be limited. 
More worrying trends during the past decade or so were declining shares of labor 
compensation and household income in national income. According to Bai and Qian (2009a 
and 2009b), the share of labor compensation in national income dropped from 51.4% in 
1995 to 40.6% in 2006 (see Figure 11). Likewise, the share of household income in national 
income declined from 66.8% in 1996 to 50.6% in 2007. We argue that the declining income 
shares of labor and households are largely attributable to distortions in factor markets. If 
these macro trends are not reversed, it would be unreasonable to expect consumption to 
pick up strongly.  
Figure 11: Shares of Labor Compensation, Household Income, and Household 
Consumption in National Income, 1990–2008 
(%) 
 
Source: Chong-en Bai and Zhenjie Qian (2009a and 2009b). 
The exchange rate option is much more sensitive. For most economists and policymakers, 
there is little disagreement about the importance of a more flexible exchange rate regime in 
the PRC. During the first fifteen years of the PRC’s economic reforms, the yuan depreciated 
by 75% in real effective terms (see Figure 12). Between January 1994 and June 2005, the 
real effective exchange rate of the yuan appreciated by 30% and, again, between June 2005 
and December 2008, it appreciated by another 19%. While the overall trend of appreciation 
is clear, the magnitudes of the changes were probably grossly insufficient, compared with 
the PRC’s  extraordinary productivity growth during the same period.  Rising external 
imbalance is one important indication of an undervalued currency. ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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Figure 12: Real Effective Exchange Rate Indices of the Yuan and US Dollar, 1980–2009 
 
Source: Citigroup 
Note: Both indices were set to 1.0 in June 2005, the month before the PRC abandoned the peg and adopted the 
managed float system. 
Exchange rate policy reform should  therefore  be a part of the program dealing with the 
imbalance problem. In fact, policymakers are probably already contemplating options for 
exiting from the current soft peg and resuming the track of gradual appreciation for the yuan. 
This will most likely happen within 2010. 
The risk now, however, is that often the exchange policy issue is singled out and sometimes 
is even politicized. These will for sure prove  counterproductive. Foreign pressures are 
sometimes useful for reformers to overcome domestic resistance. But as with US 
policymakers, PRC leaders also have to entertain domestic politics. To be seen as giving in 
to foreign pressures on important issues like exchange rate policy could significantly weaken 
the leader’s political standing. 
There is still significant disagreement on how much the currency is undervalued. For 
instance, Goldstein and Lardy (2009) suggested that, if half of 2008’s current account 
surplus was to be eliminated, then by the end of that year, the yuan  was probably 
undervalued only by 12–16%. Such adjustment, even if it took place, would not likely satisfy 
demands by most foreign country politicians. PRC  politicians would also be reluctant to 
introduce greater adjustment in the short  term, given the likely consequences for PRC 
enterprises and financial institutions. 
It might be worthwhile to point out the need for prudence regarding these estimations. For 
instance, a sharp rise in the yuan exchange rate may wipe out the PRC’s current account 
surplus, but it might not reduce the US’s current account deficits. The yuan only accounts for 
15% of the US Federal Reserve exchange rate basket for the dollar. This implies that a 20% 
appreciation of the yuan would only translate into appreciation of the dollar by 3%. More 
importantly, the market vacuum left by PRC products might be quickly filled with products 
from other low-income countries such as India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Vietnam. 
Even for the PRC, the exchange rate may not be the only, or even the most important, factor 
behind external imbalances. For instance, Woo (2006) argued that trade surpluses are better 
handled by establishment of an efficient financial intermediation mechanism than by 
appreciation of the currency. Similarly, Goldstein and Lardy (2009) argued that the exchange 
rate policy alone is not likely to be effective. The PRC’s recent experiences after the July 
2005 reform provided a useful footnote to these arguments. Between mid-2005 and mid-ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
 
22 
2008, the real effective exchange rate of the yuan  appreciated by 20%, but the PRC’s 
current account surpluses surged during the same period. 
5.3  Removing factor market distortions 
Given the structural nature of the PRC  imbalance problem, a comprehensive package 
dealing with the problem is probably preferable to an exclusive focus on the exchange rate.
4
Following the findings in this study, we argue that extraordinary growth performance and 
growing structural imbalances are actually different sides of the same coin: the asymmetric 
market liberalization approach. An effective solution to the imbalance problem, therefore, is 
to complete transition to the market economy by further liberalizing the factor markets and 
removing cost distortions. Reduction of PSEs associated with factor market distortions would 
correct the unusually high incentives for production, investment, and exports. 
 
Greater exchange rate flexibility and gradual currency appreciation should be part of that 
package. But the reality is that a sharp revaluation as demanded by some foreign politicians 
and experts is not only political unfeasible in the PRC  but also probably economically 
undesirable, at least in the near term.  
Introduction of market-based factor prices, however, cannot be done overnight. Some 
changes are relatively easy to make. The government is already looking at various ways of 
removing or reducing distortions in resource prices. From late 2009, the authorities began to 
make efforts in adjusting prices for fuel, gas, electricity, and water. In the past, the main 
hurdles for resource price liberalization were special interest groups such as agriculture, 
farmers, and low-income urban households. The government can deal with these special 
groups with fiscal instruments while pushing ahead with price liberalization. 
Distortions to environmental costs are already falling, at least as shares of GDP. This 
reflects the government’s increased efforts to protect the environment. Senior officials of the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection recently indicated that while the environmental turning 
point normally occurred when per income was US$8,000 in developed economies, it could 
happen at US$3,000 in the PRC.
5
Labor market liberalization is progressing rapidly, as evidenced by the massive number of 
migrant workers. The government also plans to make new breakthroughs in reform of the 
household registration system and propelled urbanization in 2010. But complete removal of 
this restriction and therefore discrimination against rural workers will likely take some time. 
One critical condition is the extension of the social welfare systems to all rural residents. 
However, the earlier the Lewis turning point, i.e., labor market transiting from surplus to 
shortage, arrives, the faster the labor market liberalization would occur. 
 The official also mentioned that the Ministry of Finance, 
the  State  Administration of Taxation  and the Ministry of Environmental Protection were 
considering new environmental protection taxes. 
Capital market liberalization is already gaining momentum and, according to optimistic 
judgment, could see major breakthroughs in terms of introducing market-based interest and 
exchange rates within the next 5  years. Of course, these changes are conditional on 
successful reforms of the state-owned enterprises and financial institutions and improvement 
in macroeconomic management skills. 
Privatization of land might not happen any time soon. But clearly defined and well- protected 
leasing rights and  the  freedom to circulate according to market mechanisms could also 
reduce distortions to use rates for land. 
                                                 
4 Goldstein and Lardy (2009) recommended a comprehensive package dealing with the PRC’s imbalance 
problems focusing on four policy domains: fiscal, financial, pricing, and exchange rate policies. Their policy 
recommendations share many similarities with suggestions in this study. 
5 See, for instance, report at the Xinhua News Agency website at http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-
02/10/content_12960850.htm ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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Reduction or abolition of PSEs should also be supplemented by some related reforms. For 
instance, the government will need to give up overemphasis on growth performance, which 
was in many cases the initial cause of persistent cost distortions. The government’s role 
should be the  provision of public services and maintenance of stable macroeconomic 
environment, not direct involvement in economic activities (Yao 2010).  
The state sector, which is capturing an increasing portion of national income and causing the 
imbalance problem, needs further reforms in order to share more benefits with households. 
In the minimum, the state should collect more dividends and taxes from the state-owned 
enterprises for redistribution to the broad society. Ideally, the state sector should gradually 
give up monopoly power or be privatized. 
Factor market liberalization is likely to help prevent a  further slide of household income 
shares. But if this is insufficient to reverse the trend, the government may need to step in to 
redistribute more income and wealth to the households. After all, enriching the households, 
rather than keeping more wealth at the hands of the state-owned enterprises  or the 
government, is the ultimate goal of economic reform and economic growth. 
Finally, rapid development of the service sector will be a critical benchmark for structural 
rebalancing. Factor market liberalization should realign incentives between manufacturing 
and service activities. But the government may need to help overcome some major 
obstacles for service sector development, especially  with respect to  insufficient financial 
services, high entry barriers and lack of intellectual property rights. 
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Structural rebalancing will likely remain a key policy challenge for both the global and the 
PRC economy in the years to come. In this paper, we’ve reviewed both the recent evolution 
of current account surpluses and the literature on the causes of such surpluses. Having a 
large current account surplus is a relatively recent phenomenon in the PRC and occurred 
most clearly after 2004. A significant rise in the US current account deficit happened a few 
years earlier. These suggest that the PRC should be a part of the solution to the global 
imbalance problem. It is not reasonable to blame the PRC  for  the  large  US  imbalance 
problem. 
The  six  closely related hypotheses for the PRC’s  current account imbalances—
measurement error, savings  and investment gap,  demographic  transition,  industrial 
relocation, policies pursuing strong growth, and exchange rate policy—are important factors 
related to the PRC’s imbalance problems. Unfortunately they do not offer actionable policy 
solutions for resolving such imbalance problems. Most critically, these factors generally fail 
to explain the sharp surge of current account surpluses in recent years. 
In this study, we have proposed an alternative hypothesis: asymmetric market liberalization 
and the related factor market distortions during the reform period. This particular reform 
approach generally lowers production costs and provides producer subsidy equivalents. It 
artificially raises production profits, increases investment returns and improves international 
competitiveness of PRC products. Continued factor market distortion is the cause for both 
extraordinary growth performance and growing structural imbalances during the reform 
period. 
To offer some guidance, we made some crude estimation of cost distortions for the period 
2000–2009. The results suggest that capital cost distortion was by far the most important 
component of PSEs. Labor cost distortion jumped recently as the number of migrant workers 
increased. Surprisingly, distortions to environmental costs already began to decline in recent 
years, at least as shares of GDP. 
Estimates of total PSEs provide an almost perfect fit for current account imbalances, rising 
steadily from 2000 and reaching their peak in 2006. Cost distortions increased despite the ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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fact that the factor markets were gradually liberalized, suggesting that the distorted factor 
prices did not keep up pace with market prices. Total PSEs in 2009 were back to the levels 
of 2003–2004, before the surge of current account surpluses. This may be an indication that 
although the surpluses may rebound somewhat as the global economy continues to recover, 
the worst of the PRC’s external imbalances may be behind us. 
The findings of this study have important policy implications for dealing with the imbalance 
problems. The PRC government has been trying hard rebalancing the economy since 2003 
but has achieved limited results. In fact, most imbalance problems worsened in the following 
years. The reason for the lack of success was probably because the government only 
addressed the factors on the surface, not the root cause, i.e., the distorted incentive 
structure for exporters, investors, and producers. 
Recent popular policy advices include development of the social welfare systems and 
appreciation of the currency. While these are probably useful steps to take, we do not think 
these measures alone would be effective in resolving the problem. As increasing portions of 
savings derive from the corporate sector and the household income share of the economy 
continues to decline, better social welfare systems would have limited impact on national 
saving rate and consumption. 
Greater exchange rate flexibility and gradual currency appreciation should be important parts 
of the policy package, but exclusive focus on the issue may be counterproductive. While we 
believe the government is likely to take further steps reforming the exchange rate regime in 
2010, it is politically infeasible and possibly economically undesirable for the PRC  to 
implement large-scale appreciation in the short term. At minimum, yuan appreciation alone is 
not likely to resolve the US imbalance problem. And the 2005–2008 experiences suggest 
that currency appreciation should be combined with other policy measures in controlling 
current account surpluses. 
We recommend a comprehensive policy package for dealing with the PRC’s  external 
imbalance problem. The core element of the package is to complete the transition to a 
market economy by further liberalizing the factor markets and removing all cost distortions. 
Exchange rate adjustment serves as a part of this package. The liberalization may take 
years to accomplish, but some measures can be implemented relatively quickly. The 
government is already reforming resource prices. Environmental cost distortion is already on 
the decline. Both labor and capital market liberalization could gather momentum in the 
coming year or so. 
This core element also needs to be supplemented by other reforms, including reform of the 
government’s overemphasis on GDP growth, liberalization of the state-owned enterprises 
and financial institutions, redistribution of income from the corporate sector to households, 
and removal of the barriers for service sector development. 
To summarize, the PRC’s  growing internal and external imbalances may be the  natural 
results of the PRC’s unique reform approach. The fundamental solution, therefore, lies in 
correcting the problems of that reform approach, i.e., asymmetric market liberalization. If our 
analyses and prescription are correct, then we may conclude that the worst of the external 
imbalance problem is probably over, unless cost distortions rebound sharply. The current 
and future reform initiatives would also ensure further containment of external imbalances. 
Most of these reforms, however, cannot be implemented overnight. Therefore, rebalancing 
of the PRC’s external sector may also take a few years to accomplish. ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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APPENDIX: ESTIMATION OF FACTOR MARKET 
DISTORTIONS  
This Appendix explains how cost distortions are estimated. It should be noted that these 
estimates only provide rough guidance about cost distortions. In many cases, we do not 
have reliable benchmarks and we often can only consider limited aspects of the distortions. 
However, if the methodologies are consistent, then the results should at least provide some 
good indications about changes over time. 
Labor Market 
The estimation of labor market distortion focuses on underpaid migrant workers given the 
household registration system. Migrant workers’ pay grew by an average of 7% between 
2000 and 2008, which was only half the rate of the national average of workers’ pay. This is 
why the pay gap between migrant workers and urban workers widened significantly, from 
about 30% in 2000 to 50% in 2008. In estimating cost distortion, we assume that migrant 
workers should be paid 25%  less than urban workers given likely differences in human 
capital. 
The total distortion is a product of the number of migrant workers multiplied by the pay gap. 
The distortion increased, partly because of the rapid rise in the number of migrant workers, 
from 88 million in 2000 to 140 million in 2008. As a result, labor cost distortion rose from 6 
billion yuan (or 0.1% of GDP) in 2000 to 1.13 trillion yuan (or 3.6% of GDP) in 2008. In 2008, 
it surpassed capital to become the largest cost distortion item. 
Clearly, these figures probably still underestimate the actual labor cost distortion. At the very 
least they ignore underdeveloped social welfare systems. They may also, however,  be 
biased in the opposite direction. If migrant workers’ wages are depressed, it would increase 
demand for labor and therefore create more jobs. Whether or not farmers’ income would 
increase or decrease as a result depends on labor demand elasticity with respect to wages. 
Our simple exercise does not assume a change in labor demand behavior following changes 
in labor compensation. 
Capital Market 
Capital cost distortions show in at least two forms, with the first being distorted interest rates 
and the second being  distorted exchange rates. Instead of calculating cost distortions in 
these two forms, we compute aggregate cost of distortion due to financial repression. The 
PRC  still shows typical symptoms of a financially repressed economy: regulated interest 
rates, controlled exchange rates, managed credit allocation, and dominance of both state-
owned commercial banks and state-owned enterprises. 
Following Caprio,  Atiyas,  and Hanson (1996), Huang (2010) assumed that financial 
repressions depressed the cost of capital by an average of 2 percentage points in 2008. In 
order to calculate variations of capital cost distortion, we borrow the Financial Repression 
Index from Wang (2010). By setting the index at 100 in 2008 and rebasing it to 2 percentage 
points, we can then obtain the percentage point distortions for other years covered in this 
study. The highest distortion was 3 percentage points which occurred in 2000. Distortions 
then declined gradually. 
The total cost distortions were calculated by multiplying  the total bank deposits by cost 
distortions. The total amount of distortions increased steadily, mainly because total bank 
deposits grew rapidly during that period. One potential criticism is lack of explicit estimation 
of exchange rate distortion. However, calculation of actual cost distortion due to undervalued 
currency is difficult conceptually unless it directly involves imports or exports. The financial ADBI Working Paper 279    Huang and Tao 
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repression indicators should at least partly reflect cost distortion in terms of both exchange 
rates and interest rates.  
Land Market 
In the PRC, there are different ways of setting land transfer fees. The first is essentially by 
negotiation between potential users and government entities. This method is non-market and 
is normally applied to industrial activities. The actual fees set are often much lower than 
potential market rates as the government is inclined to attract investors. The other market 
forms include bidding and auctioning, which set market rates. The market rates are on 
average six times higher than the non-market rates. 
To  calculate distortions in non-market land transfers,  we obtain the total areas of land 
transferred under the non-market approach. Unfortunately we only obtained data from 2003 
to 2007. The annual transferred land under the non-market approach fluctuated across 
years, from a low of 108,000 hectares in 2005 to 162,000 hectares in 2006. 
In 2007, the non-market transfer rate was CNY637,888 per hectare, while the market rate 
was CNY3.23 million per hectare. This gap was somewhat narrower earlier as the market 
rate was later pushed up by property market boom. Total calculated land cost distortions 
increased from around CNY150 million in 2003–2004 to CNY423 million in 2006. Since we 
do not have enough data to estimate cost distortion for 2000–2002 and 2008–2009, we 
simply assumed some numbers for these years, taking into account the trends during nearby 
years. 
The main problem with land cost distortion estimates was that we do not have market rates 
for equivalent land uses. Obviously the market rates were substantially boosted due to the 
housing boom. Such rates may not be applicable to industrial land. Also, we only calculated 
cost differences for land transferred. A better approach would be to look at the actual rental 
costs paid by industrial firms, compared with potential market rate. 
Energy Market 
Oil, coal, natural gas, and electricity constitute the majority energy use in the PRC. While the 
PRC is the largest producer and consumer of coal, prices are more or less liberalized. Our 
calculation here focuses on oil products by looking at the equivalent price gaps for domestic 
and international oil prices and total oil consumption in the PRC. There is little difference in 
the prices of crude oil produced domestically  or abroad. Price differences are mainly in 
finished goods. 
The price gaps also fluctuate from  year to year. The government already adopted a 
mechanism which links domestic oil prices to international prices with some time lags. 
Therefore, there would normally be no significant cost distortions. But when international 
prices rise sharply, the government is reluctant to let domestic prices to follow for fear of 
disruptive effects on consumption and production. This happened in the years after 2005. 
We  chose  the  New  York  harbor petroleum  price as the benchmark for international 
petroleum prices. The PRC’s petroleum prices are published by National Development and 
Reform Commission. Then we took the oil consumption into account to calculate the energy 
market distortion. It turned out that the calculated distortions were small negative numbers 
for the years 2000–2003, which means effective taxes. We think these probably reflect more 
data noise rather than actual taxes and therefore set the numbers for those years to zero. 




Distortions in environmental costs mainly reflect polluters’  undercompensation for their 
emissions. Following Huang (2010), we adopted the government estimate of environmental 
costs of 3% of GDP in 2004. We then looked at changes in emissions of SO2 and CO2 
discharge, which are categorized by the State Environmental Protection Administration.  
The aggregate emissions show peaking in 2005 and 2006. We then used these physical 
emission indices to calculate the likely cleaning costs, benchmarking them at 3% of GDP in 
2004 and applying a 5% inflation rate to obtain the nominal value of cost distortions. The 
total costs stagnated in 2006–2009 but their shares of GDP declined steadily from 3% in 
2005 to 1.9% in 2008. 
Figure A: Estimated Cost Distortions, 2000–2009 
(CNY billion) 
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